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ABSTRACT 
Robert Merton's (1957) theories of anomie and strain are among the most widely examined theories of 
criminality. Messner and Rosenfeld's (1994) theory of institutional anomie built on Merton's conception 
of anomie, delineating how specific institutions lead to conditions of anomie and criminality. Cloward 
and Ohlin's (1961) theory of differential opportunity built upon Merton's strain theory, underscoring the 
fact that those involved in illegitimate means of opportunity require a set of learned skills as do those 
involved in legitimate means. In this tradition, the present paper further expands Merton's theories of 
anomie and strain, suggesting that Merton's categories of conformist and innovator are not mutually 
exclusive. In fact, some individuals combine both legitimate and illegitimate means of opportunity in 
pursuit of the American Dream. The Maximizer, the authors suggest, merges elements of both the 
conformist and the innovator (i.e. legitimate and illegitimate means). The present paper explores the 
justification for merging legitimate and illegitimate means of opportunity in pursuit of the American 
Dream 
 
 
ARTICLE 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper builds on, but attempts to add to, anomie and strain theories as 
the latter have been conceived by Robert Merton (1938), Steven Messner 
and Richard Rosenfeld (1994), and Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin 
(1961). We provide an additional mode of adaptation to anomie and 
strain—maximization—which refers to the simultaneous utilization of legitimate 
or institutionalized means and illegitimate means in pursuit of the 
so-called American Dream. 
 
The Maximizer, an extension of Merton‘s typology and the focus of the 
present paper, is the inductive product of research which has explored perceived 
stringency in punishment compared to actual punishment as delineated 
in the United States Sentencing Commission Guideline Manual. The 
original research presented respondents with a set of vignettes and queried 
what the appropriate punishment should be for each criminal act described. 
These data were then compared to actual punishments as prescribed in the 
Guideline Manual. 
 
In doing this research, we noted an anomaly in prescribed sentencing as 
compared to Guideline dictates for a vignette in which a contractor built a 
bridge—illegally breaking code in pursuit of profit—while simultaneously 
operating a legitimate business. The outcome of the illegal behavior perpetrated 
by the contractor was the collapse of the bridge and the death of five 
motorists. Consistently respondents indicated ‗the contractor should have a 
fine imposed‘, ‗the contractor should have their license revoked‘, ‗perhaps 
it was the workers‘ fault and not that of the contractor‘, and other similar 
reactions. The researchers were struck by respondents‘ tendency to justify 
the illegal activities of the contractor; acts that led to the death of five 
human beings. This led us to suspect that one reason for this rationalization 
was that people perceived the contractor as working toward the socially 
inculcated goal of the American Dream (legitimate means of opportunity), 
a goal so overweening that it was taken to justify the illegal actions of 
cutting corners in construction and breaking code (illegitimate means of 
opportunity). Moreover, the common finding of justification for such 
actions suggested that varied people in US society are perceived as willing 
to, or actually engaged in, such combined legal and illegal activities. Thus, 
we developed the concept of the Maximizer, someone who simultaneously 
uses and incorporates legitimate and illegitimate means of opportunity in 
the pursuit of profit and/or monetary gain (the American Dream). 
 
In introducing this concept, the present paper also suggests that Merton‘s 
categories of conformist and innovator are not mutually exclusive. Rather, 
the pursuit of the American Dream leads social actors to combine both 
legitimate and illegitimate means in an effort to ‗succeed‘ within corporate 
culture. While Merton‘s theories of anomie and strain have been well 
supported over the decades, Merton did not explicitly consider utilization 
of both legitimate and illegitimate means of opportunity in pursuit of the 
American Dream. On the contrary, though, we suggest that it is possible to 
utilize both legitimate and illegitimate means in pursuit of goals, as vaguely 
suggested yet not delineated by Cloward and Ohlin (1961) in their theory 
of differential opportunity. The goal of the present paper is to advance 
Merton‘s ideas regarding anomie and strain by exploring an additional 
adaptation—maximization—which refers to implementing both legitimate 
and illegitimate means of opportunity in pursuit of the socially inculcated 
American Dream. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Merton‘s anomie and strain theories sought to explain why certain cultures, 
groups, and individuals were more prone to engage in antisocial and/or illegal 
behaviors. Merton asserted that members of society receive messages of 
what is normal—including acceptable behaviors—from societal institutions. 
Normal, according to Merton (1957: 132), is that which is the ‗psychologically 
expectable, if not culturally approved, response to determinate 
social conditions‘. Most people, most of the time, abide by society‘s rules of 
behavior, thereby remaining ‗normal‘. Yet pressures from social institutions, 
and specifically from expectations associated with the American 
Dream, can lead some ‗to engage in nonconforming rather than conforming 
conduct‘. These pressures should explain not only higher deviance by 
individuals who experience them, but also higher group deviance by members 
of the classes that most experience such pressures (Merton, 1957: 132). 
 
Merton‘s central hypotheses regarding deviance and criminality assert that 
criminality is a function of an overemphasis on the goals associated with the 
American Dream (e.g. wealth), as well as a disjuncture between the goals 
valued by society and the means available to people to achieve them 
(Merton, 1957: 162). Thus, the primary mechanism through which deviance 
and criminality is fostered has its origin in goals–means discrepancies 
(whether because of an overemphasis on cultural goals or goal blockage). 
However, Merton did not explicitly consider utilization of both legitimate 
and illegitimate means of opportunity in pursuit of the American Dream. 
 
Anomie and strain theories posit that criminality is due to an array of 
social causes. One explanation is that criminality results from personal 
states of egoism and selfishness caused by a lack of integration into, and 
regulation by, society, as in anomie theory and microanomie theory 
(Durkheim, 1893, 1897; Konty, 2005). Another is that it results from pressures 
to achieve at any cost imposed by the American Dream and the relative 
importance of the economy in our lives, as in anomie theory and 
institutional anomie theory (Merton, 1957; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994). 
Some relevant theories deal with frustration that arises from increased 
wants and desires in the context of globalization and neoliberalism, as in 
global anomie and dysnomie theory (Passas, 2000). Others focus on discrepancies 
in cultural goals and the legitimate means to achieve them, as in 
strain theory (Merton, 1957) and on goal blockage, the loss of valued items, 
negative emotion, and noxious stimuli, as in general strain theory (Agnew, 
1992, 1999, 2002; Agnew et al., 2002; Baron, 2004; Brezina, 1996; Brezina 
et al., 2001; Capowich et al., 2001; Eitle, 2002; Gibson et al., 2001; Jang 
et al., 2003;Mazerolle et al., 2000; Simons et al., 2003;Wright et al., 2001). 
Finally, some criminologists have emphasized a shared sense of relative deprivation, 
as in macrolevel general strain theory (Pratt and Godsey, 2003), 
as well as unlimited desires for wealth in the context of limited means, leading 
to a problem of adjustment, as in differential opportunity theory 
(Cloward and Ohlin, 1961). 
All of these theories, to one degree or another, blame crime on the overpowering 
influence of the economy on our lives. The theories most relevant 
for economic sources of anomie and strain, as analyzed here, include 
Merton‘s separate but related anomie and strain theories, Messner and 
Rosenfeld‘s institutional anomie theory, and Cloward and Ohlin‘s theory of 
differential opportunity. Each is reviewed below. We first review Merton‘s 
anomie and Messner and Rosenfeld‘s institutional anomie theories, and then 
move on to Merton‘s strain and Cloward and Ohlin‘s differential opportunity 
theories. We believe this is the most logical order in which to discuss these 
theories, given that Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) adapted Merton‘s theory 
of anomie, and Cloward and Ohlin adapted Merton‘s theory of strain. 
 
 
Anomie and strain perspectives 
 
Before offering a brief review it is important to note that, although most 
criminological attention has been placed on Robert Merton‘s theory of 
strain, his seminal work—Social Structure and Anomie—contains within it 
two related but independent lines of theoretical argument (Bernard, 1987; 
Featherstone and Deflem, 2003; Messner, 1988). Bernard (1987: 267) 
refers to one as a ‗cultural argument‘ (dealing with the value of monetary 
success and the importance of using legitimate means in pursuit of this 
goal), and the other as a ‗structural argument‘ (dealing with the distribution 
of legitimate opportunities in society). The former explains criminality as a 
function of pressures placed on individuals living in a capitalistic American 
society, the latter as a function of differential opportunities. 
 
Similarly, Messner (1988: 31) asserts that Merton‘s work relates to both a 
‗cultural structure‘ (pertaining to the normative values governing behaviors that 
are common to society, and which can be broken down into culturally defined 
goals and culturally defined means to achieve those goals), as well as to the 
‗social structure‘ (pertaining to a set of social relationships). Thus, Messner 
attributes to Merton a theory of social organization (relevant to the components 
of social systems) and a theory of deviant motivation (relevant to sources of 
pressure on individuals to violate social norms). Messner lays out the two theories 
this way: the first attributes criminality to a ‗disjuncture within the cultural 
structure itself … [due to] an exaggerated emphasis on goals in comparison 
with the emphasis on means‘; the second attributes criminality to ‗disjuncture 
between social structural arrangements and cultural prescriptions [when the] 
cultural structure extols the common success goals, while the social structure 
restricts access to the normative means‘ (Messner, 1988: 37). 
 
Additionally, Featherstone and Deflem (2003: 472) point out that 
Merton‘s work developed two separate but related theories. These include 
a theory of anomie (positing that there exists in American society a disjuncture 
in emphasis on culture goals and the means to achieve them), 
as well as a strain theory (positing that goal blockage leads to pursuing 
illegitimate means). According to these authors, criminality emerges due 
to anomie caused by an overemphasis on the goals associated with the 
American Dream, and due to strain caused by blocked opportunities for 
those seeking the American Dream. 
 
 
Anomie and institutional anomie 
 
Beginning with Merton‘s first theory—anomie theory—one of Merton‘s main 
points is that the so-called ‗American Dream’ is both criminogenic and the 
overriding institutionalized goal in our country. Stated simply, the American 
Dream means ‗making it‘, ‗winning the game‘, or achieving independence and 
wealth. When these goals are so emphasized that they get far more attention 
that the institutionalized means to achieve them, the result is anomie and 
criminality. When discussing a hypothetical poorly integrated culture, 
Merton explained that it is possible for culturally prescribed goals to overcome 
and completely dominate consideration of culturally prescribed means. 
In his words, ‗there may develop a very heavy, at times virtually exclusive, 
stress upon the value of particular goals, involving comparatively little concern 
with the institutionally prescribed means of striving toward these goals‘ 
(Merton, 1957: 132). According to Merton, American institutions of the 
1950s placed greater emphasis on culture goals than upon institutional or 
legitimate means to achieve them. This resulted in an overwhelming focus on 
the cultural goals of American institutions with relatively little emphasis on 
the institutionalized means. When emphasis on institutionalized means relax 
and goals are overemphasized, criminality is permissible. 
 
As Merton asserted, ‗an extreme cultural emphasis on the goal of success 
attenuates conformity to institutionally prescribed methods of moving 
toward this goal‘ (Merton, 1957: 169). Thus, the American Dream itself 
may be viewed as criminogenic. 
 
Essentially, Merton was asserting that our focus on the American Dream 
is too strong because ‗emphasis on the goal has so attenuated the satisfactions 
deriving from sheer participation in the competitive activity that only 
a successful outcome provides gratification‘ (Merton, 1957: 135). In other 
words, ‗winning‘ or ‗making it‘ according to the rules becomes secondary 
to ‗winning‘ or ‗making it‘ by any means necessary. 
 
Merton‘s analysis meant that he recognized crime as to be expected, 
given the prevalence of messages related to pursuing wealth in the US. 
Relatedly, Bernard (1987: 266) called this a ‗uniform cultural value on 
monetary success‘. In Merton‘s words again: 
 
In some large measure, money has been consecrated as a value in itself, over 
and above its expenditure for articles of consumption or its use for the 
enhancement of powers. Money is particularly well adapted to become a 
symbol of prestige … However acquired, fraudulently or institutionally, it 
can be used to purchase the same goods and services. 
(Merton, 1957: 136) 
 
Perhaps this is one reason why even the rich seek more. According to 
Merton: 
in the American Dream there is no final stopping point. The measure of 
‗monetary success‘ is conveniently indefinite and relative. At each income 
level … Americans want just about twenty-five percent more (but of course 
this ‗just a bit more‘ continues to operate once it is obtained). 
(Merton, 1957: 136) 
 
Passas underscores the never-ending pressure inherent in the motives of 
capitalism toward consumerism and an insatiable drive for more: 
 
Regardless of whether people strive for more; due to natural drives or 
because of cultural encouragement, the point is that market economies cannot 
perform without lofty aspirations, consumerism, emphasis on material/ 
monetary goals, and competition. All this leads to the pursuit of constantly 
moving targets and systematic sources of frustration. 
(2000: 19) 
 
Such frustration is one form of what Merton (1957: 139) referred to as strain. 
Hence, Merton‘s conclusion that the American Dream is criminogenic. 
 
An important part of the mantra of the American Dream is the ethos that 
success and monetary achievement result from ‗personal‘ strengths, that is, 
from hard work and determination of people with strong wills. Thus, failure 
in the United States is generally perceived as a ‗personal‘ failure rather 
than a systemic flaw (Merton, 1957: 138). Assuming all failures are personal/ 
moral failures rather than system failures, the threat or fear of defeat 
may serve to motivate people to succeed, to attain the American Dream, by 
any and all means necessary. According to Merton, ‗The moral mandate to 
achieve success … exerts pressure to succeed, by fair means if possible and 
by foul means if necessary‘ (Merton, 1957: 169). This is precisely what the 
Maximizer tries to accomplish. 
 
Thus, Merton understood that quitting is the only option that is not 
acceptable in America: 
 
Americans are admonished not to be a quitter or in the dictionary of 
American culture, as in the lexicon of youth, ‗there is no such word as fail‘. 
The cultural manifesto is clear; one must not quit, must not cease striving, 
must not lessen his goals, for not failure but low aim is crime. 
(1957: 139) 
 
Merton also stated that the American Dream emphasizes ‗penalizing…those 
who draw in their ambitions‘ (Merton, 1957: 138), as does the ritualist. 
 
Nearly 40 years later, Steven Messner and Richard Rosenfeld (1994) put 
forth their institutional anomie theory which expanded on Merton‘s theory 
of anomie. Institutional anomie theory also attributes high crime rates 
in the US to our allegiance to the American Dream. For Messner and 
Rosenfeld, this ‗dream‘ is defined as the ‗broad cultural ethos that entails a 
commitment to the goal of material success, to be pursued by everyone 
in society, under conditions of open, individual competition‘ (Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 1994: 6, emphasis added). 
 
Similar to the claims of Merton, these authors asserted that the American 
Dream ‗encourages an exaggerated emphasis on monetary achievement while 
devaluing alternative criteria of success, it promotes a preoccupation with the 
realization of goals while de-emphasizing the importance of the ways 
in which these goals are pursued‘ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 10). The 
American Dream thus creates pressure to achieve, but minimizes the pressure 
to play by the rules. Under these circumstances, people become more likely to 
use the ‗most technically efficient means necessary in reaching their goals. The 
result is a higher rate of predatory crime‘ (Bernburg, 2002: 732). 
 
Messner and Rosenfeld asserted that the needs and health of the economy 
in modern America take precedence over other important social institutions 
like the family, schools, and even places of worship. This is due to the fact 
that the ‗primary task for noneconomic institutions such as the family and 
schools is to inculcate beliefs, values, and commitments other than those of 
the marketplace‘ (Vold et al., 1998: 176). Thus, we should not expect these 
types of institutions to control antisocial and criminal behaviors when they 
are weakened. Instead, ‗when other institutions such as polity, religion, 
education, and the family are unable to regulate human impulses generated 
by the economy, criminality and deviance are more likely‘ (Robinson, 2004: 
227; citing Chamlin and Cochran, 1995). 
 
According to Messner and Rosenfeld (1994), the economy takes precedence 
in capitalism when: (1) non-economic institutions are devalued; 
(2) norms and values of non-economic institutions give way to norms and 
values of economic institutions; and (3) non-economic institutions make 
accommodations to economic institutions (also see Chamlin and Cochran, 
1995; Maume and Lee, 2003; Piquero and Piquero, 1998; Savolainen, 
2000). Criminal behavior is most likely when ‗the value-orientation of the 
market economy, that is, the pursuit of self-interest, attraction to monetary 
rewards, and competition, become exaggerated relative to the value-orientations 
of institutions such as the family, education, and the polity‘ (Bernburg, 
2002: 732). There are at least two reasons criminality results from this 
arrangement: ‗The emphasis on the American Dream leads to both intense 
cultural pressures for monetary success and an increase in anomie [and the] 
dominance of the economy in the social structure … weakens the regulatory 
efficacy of noneconomic institutions‘ (Maume and Lee, 2003: 1140). 
 
The phenomenon of cultural pressures pushing toward monetary success 
is explained by Savolainen, who writes: 
An institutional balance of power in which the economy dominates other 
institutions is assumed to be the most conducive to high rates of serious 
crime because such an arrangement is the least capable of restraining criminal 
motivations stimulated by the logic of egalitarian market capitalism. At 
the level of culture, institutional imbalance of this description generates 
value orientations that emphasize efficiency norms at the expense of moral 
considerations … the ‗mood‘ of the society becomes more predatory. At the 
level of social structure, weak noneconomic institutions are less capable of 
providing stakes in conformity in the form of meaningful social roles. 
(2000: 1022) 
 
Thus, the theory ‗sees crime rates as a function of the American Dream‘s 
cultural emphasis on economic success in combination with an institutional 
structure dominated by the economy‘ (Pratt and Godsey, 2003: 615). 
 
 
Strain and differential opportunity 
 
Robert Merton‘s second theoretical idea—strain theory—holds that a disjuncture 
between goals and means is responsible for criminality. According to 
Merton (1957: 132), ‗culturally defined goals, purposes and interests‘ are 
comprised of ‗a frame of aspirational reference. They are the things ―worth 
striving for‖.‘ These goals are institutional in that they arise from, and are 
reinforced by, social institutions including informal sources of culture goals 
such as families and schools (Merton, 1957: 137). The ‗acceptable modes of 
reaching out for these goals‘ are the institutionalized or legitimate means. 
They are ‗regulations, rooted in the mores or institutions, of allowable 
procedures for moving toward [cultural objectives]‘ (Merton, 1957: 132). 
Certain means are required, some are allowed, others are preferred, while illegitimate 
means are prohibited. Merton‘s terms for these, respectively, are prescriptions, 
permissions, preferences, and proscriptions (Merton, 1957: 132). 
 
Living in a ‗culture-bearing society‘ (especially under the pressures produced 
by the American Dream) causes great difficulty for individuals 
including strain (Merton, 1957: 139). Merton developed five modes of 
adaptation to cultural strain: Conformity, Innovation, Ritualism, 
Retreatism, and Rebellion. These adaptations to strain are depicted in 
Table 1. Each of the five categories refers to ‗role behavior in specific types 
of situations, not to personality … types of more or less enduring response, 
not types of personality organization‘ (Merton, 1957: 140). 
 
Conformity, ‗the most common and widely diffused‘ adaptation refers to 
acceptance of both cultural goals, and institutional means to achieve them 
(Merton, 1957: 141). Innovation describes ‗the individual [who] has assimilated 
the cultural emphasis upon the goal without equally internalizing the 
institutional norms governing ways and means for its attainment‘ (Merton, 
1957: 141).Merton (1957: 144–145) thus asserted that not only do the poor 
accept the American Dream but also that ‗the avenues available for moving 
toward this goal are largely limited by the class structure to those of deviant 
behavior‘. Ritualism ‗involves the abandoning or scaling down of the lofty 
cultural goals of great pecuniary success and rapid social mobility to the 
 
 
 
point where one‘s aspirations can be satisfied‘. Retreatism, the least common 
adaptation according to Merton, involves a rejection of both the goals of the 
culture, and the institutionalized means to achieve them; the Marxist construct 
of the lumpen proletariat would fit under the aegis of this adaptation. 
Merton‘s final adaptation to strain, Rebellion, also involves rejection of both 
the culture goals and institutionalized means. But those who pursue rebellion 
develop their own substitute goals and means that often conflict with 
those endorsed by societal institutions such as the family and schools. 
 
Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin (1961: 85) concurred with Merton‘s 
central thesis concerning strain. They discussed how people‘s desires for 
wealth are virtually unlimited. As they asserted, ‗There is every reason to 
think that persons variously located in the social hierarchy have rather different 
chances of reaching common success-goals despite the prevailing 
ideology of equal opportunity.‘ The variants of success in pursuit of the 
American Dream lead to feelings of strain in individuals, or what Cloward 
and Ohlin called ‗a major problem of adjustment‘. Strain not only can lead 
to criminality among individuals, but can also lead to shared feelings of 
oppression and thus a subculture: 
 
The disparity between what lower-class youth are led to want and what is 
actually available to them is the source of a major problem of adjustment. 
Adolescents who form delinquent subcultures … have internalized an 
emphasis upon conventional goals. Faced with limitations on legitimate 
avenues of access to these goals, and unable to revise their aspirations downward, 
they experience intense frustrations; the exploration of nonconformist 
alternatives may be the result. 
 
Some barriers to success discussed by Cloward and Ohlin include educational, 
cultural, and economic obstacles that lead to incorporation of illegitimate 
means of opportunity. 
 
Cloward and Ohlin were among the first to explicitly state that both 
legitimate and illegitimate opportunities can vary among people and places. 
Other anomie and strain theories were incomplete, Cloward and Ohlin 
(1961: 145) argued, because they ignored ‗the relative availability of illegal 
alternatives to various potential criminals‘. Just as there is a differential 
distribution of legitimate means, there also is a differential distribution of 
illegitimate means. 
 
In sum, Cloward and Ohlin delineated the reality that an Innovator needs 
to learn the skills of, and have opportunities for, illegitimate behavior, just 
as the Conformist needs to learn the skills requisite in, and have opportunities 
for, the socially acceptable pursuit of the American Dream. It seems 
logical that, for many individuals, groups, types of occupational roles, and 
subcultures, opportunities will exist for simultaneously engaging in legitimate 
and illegitimate behaviors, or both Conformity and Innovation, and 
that in some circumstances, regularly engaging in conforming and innovative 
behaviors is actually expected of people. 
 
 
A gap in the literature 
 
Although Merton‘s theories posit modes of adaptation as ideal types rather 
than types of personality—meaning that the modes of adaptation are not 
mutually exclusive since individuals can behave in ways consistent with 
more than one mode of adaptation—to date no anomie or strain theory has 
explicitly recognized the possibility that individuals simultaneously and regularly 
hold norms consistent with more than one mode of adaptation. 
In this paper, we present a new mode of adaptation—Maximization— 
referring to simultaneously and regularly accepting the norms of Conformity 
and Innovation (i.e. law-abiding and law-breaking behaviors). We assert that 
the American Dream contains within it situations that encourage and even 
sometimes mandate violating the criminal law as a component or codicil of 
legitimate activity in pursuit of the American Dream. 
 
It is clear from the work of Cloward and Ohlin (1961: 150) that ‗each 
individual occupies a position in both legitimate and illegitimate opportunity 
structures‘. This means, of course, that it is possible to simultaneously 
implement legitimate and illegitimate means in pursuit of goals. Yet, neither 
Merton nor Cloward and Ohlin explicitly explored this adaptation to 
strain, nor has any anomie or strain theorist since. 
 
Our assertion, to be developed in the remainder of this paper, is that 
some individuals, groups, occupational roles, and subcultures regularly 
accept (and engage in) both legitimate and illegitimate means of opportunity 
in pursuit of the American Dream. These people abide by the law and 
the rules of the game as well as break them, often simultaneously, in order 
to achieve the consecrated value of money, to overcome goals–means discrepancies, 
and/or to win the game. 
 
We are not saying that Maximization is a unique personality type, any more 
so than Conformity or Innovation (or other modes of adaptation). As noted 
earlier, Merton explained that a mode of adaptation also refers to ‗role behavior 
in specific types of situations, not to personality … types of more or less 
enduring response, not types of personality organization‘ (Merton, 1957: 
140). We assert that since people regularly and simultaneously pursue legitimate 
and illegitimate means of opportunity in pursuit of their goals, Merton‘s 
characterization of the Conformist and Innovator is incomplete. 
 
 
 
An expanded typology 
 
When one explicitly considers illegitimate means in pursuit of the American 
Dream, a new adaptation to strain emerges. Our Table 2 depicts this new 
mode of adaptation. Table 2 illustrates that Merton‘s five modes of adaptation 
are left intact. Since we have already defined those modes of adaptation, 
we will only focus here on the one we have added: the Maximizer. Note that 
we have added a third column to Merton‘s typology. The new column represents 
acceptance or rejection of utilization of illegitimate means (i.e. criminality) 
in pursuit of one‘s goals. 
 
 
The Maximizer 
 
Those involved in Maximization, like those involved in Conformity, accept 
culture goals and therefore are in pursuit of the American Dream. The difference 
is that those who utilize strategies of Conformity pursue legitimate or 
institutionalized means to achieve their goals of ‗making it‘ or ‗winning‘ the 
game, whereas those who utilize strategies of Maximization pursue legitimate 
or institutionalized means as well as illegitimate or non-institutionalized 
means in pursuit of culture goals. Thus, Maximization involves a combination 
of Conformity and Innovation.Maximization, we believe, refers to a role 
behavior that emerges in specific types of situations and that it is a form of 
enduring response to strain found in those specific types of situations. 
 
An example ofMaximization might better illustrate our intended meaning. 
A building contractor involved in legitimate business is, by definition, using 
legitimate or institutionalized means in pursuit of the American Dream. This 
is Conformity. Those contractors who also regularly accept norms that allow 
criminal behavior as part of the job and thus commit deviant acts and/or 
break the law to achieve even greater profit/wealth would be characterized as 
Maximizers. The Maximizer is one who utilizes both legitimate and illegitimate 
means in pursuit of the American Dream. He or she must have the 
knowledge, skills, and opportunities necessary to engage in a legal trade, as 
well the knowledge, skills, and opportunities necessary to successfully commit 
criminal behavior aimed at maximizing the American Dream. 
 
In America, it appears that chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief 
financial officers (CFOs) of large and small businesses are often willing to 
commit deviant acts and/or break the law to achieve even greater wealth 
(Huffington, 2003; Reiman and Leighton, 2003). These too are 
Maximizers. In fact, it appears that to no small degree, in the business 
world, Maximization is the preferred strategy used to increase profits and 
wealth. Because of this, criminality within corporations appears quite normal 
within many corporate subcultures. 
 
 
The Maximizer: contemporary examples 
 
Research shows Maximization to be a mode of adaptation regularly used in 
the business world to adapt to strain in the workplace. For example, in his 
study of heavy electrical equipment antitrust cases, Geis (1996) illustrated 
how high-ranking business figures in two major corporations charged with 
antitrust violations justified their violations. To some, their crimes were justified 
by the altruistic purpose of economic improvement. Others rationalized 
their illegal behaviors as law-abiding since their behaviors led to 
reward. Still others acknowledged their actions as illegal but asserted they 
were not harmful and thus were acceptable. Some saw the behavior as so 
normal that it could not be seen as illegal. 
 
Most important to the concept of Maximization is that many corporate 
executives asserted that their behaviors were normal in the context of big 
business. Geis suggested that, for some individuals, the illegal behaviors 
were just part of a way of life entered into like other parts of the job. For 
example, antitrust violations were not only acceptable but also an expected 
way of doing business, especially for those who were team players and who 
wanted to advance to higher positions within the corporation. Many illegal 
acts committed in this context can be seen as a form of Conformity, one 
that might not be generally appropriate for ‗free society‘ but that is actually 
expected in the realm of big business. Consider again Merton‘s point that 
failure to succeed in America is perceived as a personal failure. This is 
strong motivation to succeed by any means, including illegal ones if necessary. 
Given that high-level corporate executives made it clear that price fixing 
was ‗normal‘ and to be expected, and since quitting is not an option, it 
is not surprising that some executives engaged in these illegal activities. 
 
Executives in the Geis study said that their illegal acts were an inevitable 
part of business, caused by the nature and extent of competition within and 
between businesses. Thus, some executives justified their acts with the belief 
that if they did not do it, someone else would. Here, executives were likely 
offering some after-the-fact excuses—or ‗techniques of neutralization‘—for 
their criminal behaviors (Sykes and Matza, 1958). 
 
But our main interest here is not the excuses offered by offenders after 
they are apprehended and are likely trying to avoid serious consequences 
for their acts of wrongdoing. Rather, we assert that maximizing strategies 
correspond to many situation in US society (especially within the business 
world) where groups and individuals are expected to pursue illegal acts in 
the context of legal acts in order to ‗get ahead‘, to ‗win the game‘. 
 
More recent cases of corporate crime support this notion. For example, 
studies of both defective products and the tobacco industry illustrate the 
concept of Maximization. Many of the most well-known cases deal with 
automobiles. Automobiles are typically found to be defective in one of two 
ways. First, there are design defects that are discovered by corporations and 
not fixed. Secondly, corporations routinely resist safety devices until forced 
to adopt them by public demand (Robinson, 2006). Examples of the latter 
include resisting putting in safety windshields and air bags. 
 
The most well known case of a defective product involved a car that was 
known by its manufacturer to be defective—the Ford Pinto—but was not 
recalled for the purpose of saving the company money (Henry, 1982). This 
automobile was manufactured in the 1970s despite the findings of pre-crash 
tests showing that fuel lines regularly ruptured as a result of rear-end collisions. 
Ford learned that it would cost only $11 per car to fix the automobiles. 
Yet, in a cost–benefits analysis, Ford calculated that it would still save 
$87.5 million by not fixing the cars (Robinson, 2006). This was based on 
the assumption that hundreds of people would be killed and injured and 
thousands of cars burned, at minimal costs to the company. Unfortunately 
for Ford and the driving public, Ford underestimated the prevalence of the 
crashes and the size of the civil judgments against it. In actuality, it would 
have been cheaper to fix the cars before they rolled out onto the nation‘s 
streets (Becker et al., 2002). 
 
Examination of the Ford Pinto case supports the construct of maximization. 
Ford Engineer Dennis Gioia says that engineers knew the 
 
hazard existed in the Pinto [and that] managers made a cost–benefit decision 
that the cost of fixing the problem outweighed the human cost of accidents 
it might cause. Bad moral choices were made because [I] was following 
schematized scripts prevalent in the decision environment of the company. 
In this case, ethical [and] moral considerations were not part of the preferred 
scripts … so [they] did not influence the decision-making process to any 
great extent. 
(1996: 139) 
 
In other words, Maximization took precedence over morality. 
 
More recently, the ‗Ford/Firestone fiasco‘ led to dozens of deaths as consumers 
died when their Ford Explorers rolled over after their Firestone tires 
exploded (Karr, 2001, 2002). Ford Explorers, like other SUVs with a high 
center of gravity, are prone to rollovers. Further, Firestone tires, when 
under-inflated, are prone to tread separation. Apparently, the combination 
leads to deadly results. CEOs of both Ford and Firestone denied any wrongdoing 
or fault, and each pointed the finger at the other. Firestone tires on 
Ford Explorers were replaced in more than 10 other countries almost two 
years earlier than in the United States, and the Ford Explorer was subsequently 
redesigned for ‗a smoother ride‘ (Robinson, 2006). 
 
Documents internal to the companies show that they were aware of the 
problems and kept them secret. This is typical in defective products cases, 
including other automobiles such as General Motors (GM) approved conversion 
vans, defective seat belts and seat belt buckles in some GM and Ford 
cars, faulty back-door latches in Chrysler minivans (that open when struck 
from the rear or side and cause passengers to be thrown out on to the street), 
and GM sidebag and sidesaddle gas tanks located on the side of trucks outside 
of the protective frame that easily rupture when struck from the side. In 
1992, NHTSA asked GM to voluntarily recall pickup trucks with such gas 
tanks but GM refused. The Department of Transportation Secretary found 
in 1994 that GM had known about the defect since the 1970s. General 
Motors entered into a deal with the Department of Justice to avoid a recall 
and paid hundreds of millions in settlements to victims instead. 
 
In at least some companies of the automobile industry, Maximization 
thus appears to be the norm. The companies make a legal product in pursuit 
of the American Dream (Conformity) while simultaneously and regularly 
cutting corners and failing to follow required safety regulations 
(Innovation) in order to save money and be more successful than the competition. 
The fact that people are injured and die as a result—including their 
own customers!—appears to be irrelevant. Clearly, some major American 
car companies accept and promote norms in favor of Conformity as well 
as Innovation, simultaneously. And they regularly use both in producing, 
advertising, and selling their products. 
 
Another example of Maximization can be found in the tobacco industry. 
Tobacco use is the leading cause of preventable death in the United States, 
making cigarettes the most commonly recognized defective product in the 
United States. Simply stated, cigarettes—a delivery device for the addictive 
drug of nicotine—contain thousands of chemicals and more than 60 known 
and suspected carcinogens (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2006). Studies of tobacco activities and internal documents of tobacco companies 
show that major tobacco corporations purposely misled the public 
and Congress for more than 40 years with regard to the dangers of smoking 
cigarettes. Research has also documented: intentional marketing to 
children and adolescents through misleading product advertisements in 
magazines, movies, and popular hang-outs; making products increasingly 
addictive by adding nicotine and chemicals that heightened the effects of 
nicotine; attacking and attempting to discredit anti-smoking advocates and 
whistle-blowers; and lying under oath to Congress when asked about the 
addictiveness of their products. As if this were not bad enough, companies 
have also been shown to financially coerce other companies which make 
smoking-cessation products and to intentionally fund and produce faulty 
science through a ‗Tobacco Institute‘ that clouds over significant issues 
(Glantz et al., 1998; Lovell, 2002; Mollenkamp et al., 1998; Orey, 1999; 
Wolfson, 2001). Civil juries in some states have found tobacco companies 
liable for reckless disregard for human life, outrageous conduct, negligence, 
misrepresentation of the facts, fraud, and even selling a defective product. 
 
Probably more than any other industry, actions by executives at large 
tobacco companies best represent the concept of Maximization. The culture 
of big tobacco—referring to the beliefs, values, and norms that dictate 
its corporate practices and the behaviors of its employees—is criminogenic. 
Although the companies make a legal product in pursuit of the 
American Dream (Conformity), they simultaneously and regularly engage 
in reckless, negligent, and knowing behaviors that lead to the deaths of 
hundreds of thousands of Americans every year (Innovation). That 
430,000 Americans die every year from tobacco-related illness, millions 
more are ‗injured‘ by smoking, and that $75 billion is spent on direct health 
care costs treating tobacco-related illnesses is irrelevant to the 
behaviors of the ‗Maximizers‘ in the tobacco industry. Instead, like car 
companies, tobacco companies accept and promote norms in favor of 
Conformity and Innovation simultaneously. And they regularly use both in 
producing, advertising, and selling their products. 
 
Some of the most recent research on corporate and white-collar crimes 
also finds evidence consistent with Maximization as a mode of adaptation 
to strain associated with the business world. For example, research on occupational 
fraud (Holtfreter, 2005), corporate accounting fraud (Pontell, 
2004), environmental crimes (Wolf, 2006), so-called ‗accidents‘ of the 
chemical industry (Pearce and Tombs, 1998), the manipulation of the natural 
environment which exacerbates natural disasters (Green, 2005), creating 
global hunger through monopolization of bio-technology (Walters, 
2006), and even the awarding of post-war construction contracts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Hogan et al., 2006) finds that such acts are normal 
and expected parts of the business world. That some of these acts are not 
‗criminal‘ is irrelevant (Passas, 2005). Given the harms they cause and the 
intentional, reckless, negligent, and knowing character of the acts, they can 
easily be considered ‗criminal‘ in the sense of involving actions that are fundamentally 
wrong (Robinson, 2005). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are at least two reasons to expect that those who have money and 
power—those who have already made it—will continue to experience 
anomie and strain. First, as Merton, Messner and Rosenfeld, Cloward 
and Ohlin, and other anomie and strain theorists have pointed out, one 
can never have enough in the US. Someone always has more, giving us all 
something to strive for so that keeping up with the Joneses has escalated 
to keeping up with Warren Buffet and ultimately Bill Gates. Secondly, to 
some degree, deviance and criminality are widespread among powerful 
elites, especially corporate CEOs and CFOs (Reiman and Leighton, 2003; 
Robinson, 2005). This means wealthy individuals often debate whether to 
abide by the law (because it is the right thing to do for society) or to abide 
by the expectations imposed on them to abide by the rules of the game 
which sometimes call for violating the law (because it is the right thing 
to do for the company). We assert that it is very likely that within the 
American corporation (legitimate means), deviance (illegitimate means) 
is no longer deviant but rather normal among corporate leaders 
(Clinard and Yeager, 2005; Friedrichs, 2008; Geis and Pontell, 2006; 
Mokhiber and Weissman, 1999; Rosoff et al., 2002; Simon, 2006; 
Simon and Hagan, 1999). That is, Maximization is widespread in the 
corporate world. 
 
In the contemporary US, the reluctance to see white-collar and corporate 
offenders as criminals (Friedrichs, 2003) may be due to the fact 
that they are viewed as important men and women (mostly men) who 
are in pursuit of the American Dream—often at any and all costs. 
Rather than labeling such actors as criminals, we accept them as 
‗shrewd, smart, and successful men‘ harking back to the robber barons 
of times past (Merton,1957: 142). 
 
Anomie and strain theories blame crime on the overpowering influence 
of the economy on our lives. In particular, Merton‘s theories of anomie 
and strain, Messner and Rosenfeld‘s theory of institutional anomie, and 
Cloward and Ohlin‘s theory of differential opportunity assert that criminality 
is a function of factors such as: goals–means discrepancies; the consecration 
of money itself as a value; internalizing the goals of the American 
Dream while failing to internalize legitimate means of opportunity; an 
overemphasis on the goal of the American Dream; an exaggerated emphasis 
on monetary gain and pursuit of self-interest; and impulses unregulated 
by non-economic institutions. 
 
Merton created five modes of adaptation to such sources of anomie and 
strain, but failed to consider utilization of legitimate and illegitimate means 
of opportunity in pursuit of one‘s goals. Cloward and Ohlin suggested that, 
as means of legitimate opportunity vary, so too do means of illegitimate 
opportunity. Yet, in their work on subcultural responses to strain, they also 
did not consider utilization of legitimate and illegitimate means of opportunity 
in pursuit of one‘s goals. 
 
Thus, in this paper, we expanded Merton‘s typology by adding 
explicit consideration of the utilization of illegitimate means simultaneously 
with legitimate or institutionalized means in pursuit of goals 
subsumed within the American Dream. The result is a new mode of 
adaptation to strain. We focused on the adaptation to strain implemented 
by the Maximizer, who merges both legitimate and illegitimate 
means in pursuit of the socially inculcated American Dream. 
Maximization is an adaptation whereby individuals simultaneously 
and regularly accept and utilize legitimate and illegitimate means of 
opportunity in pursuit of the American Dream. As argued here, we 
believe the manufacture of defective products, as well as the actions of 
big tobacco companies, represent the adaptation of Maximization. If 
so, pressures to achieve at any cost imposed by the American Dream 
are a significant reason why much corporate crime occurs in the United 
States. 
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